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THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY
Jerome J. Shestackt
If there is one area of agreement between the proponents and op-
ponents of the public authority, it is that the authority is one of the
most significant and widespread developments in state and local govern-
ment in the past quarter of a century.' Today, state and local govern-
ments employ authorities for such varied purposes as the construction
and operation of transportation services, marketing facilities, recrea-
tion centers, public utilities, schools, airports, bridges and turnpikes.2
Authorities now represent several billions of dollars in capitalization
and their obligations are significant on the investment market.3
The rapid growth of the authority and the increased reliance upon
its use has raised challenging questions concerning its appropriateness
as an instrument of government.4 The purpose of this article is to dis-
cuss briefly the history and nature of the public authority, to examine
its advantages and disadvantages and to suggest areas in which the
authority may be most appropriately utilized.
NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY
Briefly, a public authority is a corporate body authorized by
legislative action to function outside of the regular structure of state
or local government in order to finance, construct and usually to
operate revenue-producing enterprises.
The states have provided for the creation of authorities in various
ways. In most jurisdictions, authorities, especially on the state level,
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1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES, For-
ward (1953); FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 25 (1949); TEMPORARY STATE
COMmSSION ON COORDINATION OF STATE ACTIVITIES, FIRST INTERIM STAFF REPORT ON
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES UNDER NEW YORK STATE 23 (1954).
2. A list of the major road, bridge and tunnel authorities, port dock and terminal
authorities, state building authorities, and water and power authorities is contained in
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMrNTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30-35.
3. See The State and Municipal Hundred Million Club, The Bond Buyer, Dec.
10, 1956, p. 68.
4. Concern at the ramifications of the increase of authorities has been expressed
by the Governors' Conference, by the President's Committee on Administrative Man-
agement, by the Hoover Commission and by many others. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 1, Foreward; FORDHAM, A LARGER CONCEPT OF COM-
MUNITY 23-25 (1956); T MPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON COORDINATION OF STATE
AcrivrTris, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24.
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are created by special acts of the legislature. Such, for example, is
the pattern in New York.5 Other states authorize the creation of public
authorities under general enabling acts. The outstanding example is
Pennsylvania which, under The Municipality Authorities Act of 1945,'
enables local governments to create local authorities to operate a broad
variety of projects. Some states such as Alabama and Michigan permit
the establishment of authorities for limited purposes, such as the con-
struction of industrial and commercial buildings for rental to private
business 7 or the construction of off-street parking facilities.
In general, the authority has the status of a public corporation 
8
and may make contracts, acquire and dispose of real and personal
property, sue and be sued, borrow money and issue evidences of in-
debtedness, fix rates and collect fees or charges for the use of facilities,
and hire personnel.'
The authority is usually managed by a board or commission which
determines policy within the framework of the authority's jurisdiction
and approves, modifies or rejects actions suggested by a full-time
employee who serves as the principal executive officer of the board.
The members of the authority are generally appointed-by the gover-
nor, in the case of a state authority, and by the mayor or city council,
in the case of a local authority-and often serve without salary."0 Fre-
5. In 1938, following the recommendations of The Moffat Committee, a constitu-
tional amendment was passed in New York requiring that all authorities be created by
special act of the legislature. See Joint Legislative Committee on State Fiscal Policies,
Report, N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 41, C. 8 (1938).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 29002-5 (Purdon Supp. 1955) provides: "A. Every
Authority incorporated under this act . . . shall be for the purpose of acquiring, hold-
ing, constructing, improving, maintaining and operating, owning, leasing, either in the
capacity of lessor or lessee, projects of the following kind and character, buildings to
be devoted wholly or partially for public uses, including public school buildings, and
for revenue-producing purposes; transportation, marketing, shopping, terminals,
bridges, tunnels, flood control projects, highways, parkways, traffic distribution centers,
parking spaces, airports and all facilities necessary or incident thereto, parks, recrea-
tion grounds and facilities, sewers, sewer systems or parts thereof, sewage treatment
works, including works for treating and disposing of industrial waste, . . . steam heat-
ing plants and distribution systems, incinerator plants, waterworks, water supply works,
water distribution systems, swimming pools, playgrounds, lakes, low head dams, hos-
pitals, motor buses for public use, when such motor buses are to be used within any
municipality, and subways. . . ." Under this broad grant, authorities at the local level
have had their greatest prevalence in Pennsylvania. See Lindsay, The Municipal Au-
thority in Pennsylvania, Pa. Dep't of Internal Affairs Monthly Bull., Aug. 1951,
p. 16; The Bond Buyer, March 21, 1953.
7. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36.
8. In some cases, an authority may lack corporate status, although it possesses
many corporate attributes; examples are the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, the
State Bridge Commission of Ohio, the Washington Toll Bridge Authority and the
West Virginia Turnpike Commission.
9. See Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47
YALE L.J. 14 (1937).
10. For a survey of the tenure compensation and other incidents of membership
some typical authorities, see COUNCIL ov STA r GovZRNMXNTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at
40-49.
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quently one or more state officials serve on the authority as ex officio
members. 1
Authorities generally are exempt from the usual governmental
controls and act independently in such areas as personnel administra-
tion, accounting, budget, purchasing, financial management and legal
services.
The most prominent feature of the authority lies in the use of reve-
nue bond financing. In general, revenue bonds are obligations whose
interest and principal are to be paid solely from the revenues earned
by the facilities constructed from the proceeds of the bond sales, as dis-
tinguished from the tax-supported general obligation of regular govern-
mental units. They do not require a pledge, of the credit of the state or
municipality, and are not regarded as general obligations of the state. 2
The form of the authority was shaped by several needs. A's a
reaction to speculative and irresponsible financial spending by state and
local governments in the middle 1800's, constitutional provisions were
adopted in numerous states severely limiting the borrowing power.'3
The debt restrictions of the nineteenth century, however, did not re-
strict the demands of the twentieth. With urbanization and indus-
trialization came not only the need for the expansion of existing public
facilities, but also a new concept of the sphere of local and state govern-
ment which resulted in demands for many services which had hitherto
been considered the domain of private enterprises. These demands,
coupled with increased resistance to increases in taxation, led to in-
tense pressures upon the local government to find means to finance pub-
lic improvements through borrowing that would not conflict with debt
limitations. At the same time the corporate form of organization be-
came a symbol of efficient business management that was thought
adaptable to the management of public enterprises. Finally, there was
11. Ex officio members generally predominate in the case of building authorities
since such authorities are established primarily to facilitate the programs of particular
governmental agencies. Among the non-building authorities, ex officio members are
found most frequently in those administering roads, bridges and market facilities. Ex
officio membership is relatively infrequent in other types of authorities. Ibid.
12. The most comprehensive recent text on revenue bonds is CHIRMAK, Tian LAW
op' RrVmNUI4 BoNDs (1954). Thorough earlier works are FOWLER, RjvZmNU BONDS
(1938) ; KNAPP4N, RZVZNU BONDS AND THE INVgSTOR (1939). It should be noted that
authority bonds may pledge the general obligation of the authority, but this does not
place the bonds in the general obligation bond category, since the authority lacks the
taxing power.
13. Constitutional restrictions were first applied to the state as a reaction to im-
prudent fiscal policies incident to canal improvements, railroad aid and other costly
internal improvements. See SgcIST, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O' THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RSTmICTIONS UPON PUBLIC IND4BTgMMSS IN T rn UNIT4D SrAMrgS 13-26 (1914). Re-
striction of municipal indebtedness appeared sporadically in the 1850's and the 1860's
and received significant impetus as a result of the economic crisis of 1873-1874. For
a concise history of such restrictions, see Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improve-
mnents as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 CoLum. L. Rzv. 177 (1937).
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a need to develop an effective agency to handle interstate and inter-
community problems.'
Although public authorities appeared in this country '6 as early as
the 1890's," the first major impetus to the authority movement took
place with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in
1921.'" Within the five year period between 1926 and 1931, the Au-
thority had marketed $142,000,000 in bonds secured by the revenues of
bridges, tunnels and other authority projects." That body, with its
striking record, was the star that the coming galaxy of authorities
sought to emulate.
The depression, which brought about an increase in public work
construction as a means of stimulating recovery, also brought about
a shrinkage in the assessed valuation of taxable property and hence a
reduction in borrowing power. This accentuated the need for revenue
bond financing and proved a stimulus to the growth of public au-
thorities. 9 Encouragement came also from the federal government
through such measures as the power of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation to lend funds for self-liquidating projects of public bodies,
the letter in 1934 from President Roosevelt to the governors of the
states suggesting the adoption of legislation that would authorize
revenue bond financing and the creation of public authorities,2" and
the financial assistance provided by the United States Housing Act of
1937. As a result, between 1933 and 1939 there were widespread
enactments of revenue bond legislation and of statutes authorizing local
governments to establish authorities for a variety of purposes.
2 1
14. See generally CouNcIL or STATn GOVXRNM NTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22-28;
Nehemkis, supra note 9.
15. The authority, of course, is not indigenous to the United States. See, e.g.,
WBR, STATUTORY AUTHORITrIES FOR SPECIAL PURosas 17 (1922).
16. For example, the Kennebeck District in Maine with many of the incidents of
the modern authority was created in 1899. See KNAPPN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 227.
17. For an excellent brief history of the New York Port Authorities, see Gold-
stein, Metropolitan Area Government-A Functional Approach, the Authority Role,
The Bond Buyer, Sept. 8, 1956, p. 3. See also BARD, THI PoRT OP THX NtW YORK
AUTHORITY (1939) ; BiRD, A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK PORT AUTHORITY (1949).
18. Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by
Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. Rtv. 678, 680 (1955). Among the facilities of the New York
Port Authority are the Bayonne Bridge, George Washington Bridge, Goethals Bridge,
Holland Tunnel, Lincoln Tunnel, New York Truck Terminal, Newark Truck Ter-
minal, Port Authority Bus Building, La Guardia Airport, Newark Airport and New
York International Airport.
19. For a concise summary of the development of revenue bond financing, see
Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 CoLum. L. Rav. 395, 400-01 (1942).
20. Discussed in Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises, 35 Mica. L.
Rsv. 1, 5 (1936).
21. At least nineteen states enacted statutes creating authorities for financing rev-
enue producing projects between 1933 and 1936. An appendix to Foley, supra note 20,
at 30-39 contains a useful index of the early legislation. The bulk of the housing au-
thority legislation was enacted between 1936 and 1941.
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World War II brought a halt to state and local construction pro-
grams and hence witnessed the creation of relatively few authorities.
In the postwar era, however, the demand for public improvements grew
apace. Authorities, popularized as a quick means of realizing new
facilities, have not only multiplied with vigor but have found use in
new areas such as toll road operation, port development and govern-
ment building.
With this brief background, the advantages and disadvantages of
the authority may perhaps be best assessed by examining its functions
in the following areas: (1) financing; (2) management; and (3)
planning and responsibility.22
FINANCING
One of the primary advantages claimed for the authority is that it
permits the financing of improvements outside state constitutional debt
limitations.2"
The states whose constitutions do not restrict public borrowing
are few.24 Most state constitutions either prescribe that public borrow-
ing may take place only where approval is received by popular refer-
endum 2' or proscribe any debt (with minor exceptions) beyond an
amount which most of these states long ago reached.26 Local govern-
ment debt is also restricted, generally by the limitation based on the
"debt-to-property" ratio under which indebtedness is limited to a fixed
percentage of taxable property in the local government unit.
27
With the path to constitutional amendment of debt limitations
generally blocked by vociferous and articulate advocates of govern-
mental economy, as well as by the complications of the amending
22. Manifestly, variations in the authority operation are numerous and hence ex-
ceptions will be found to almost any general statement made. The discussion that fol-
lows, however, is based on the prevailing pattern of authority operation.
23. TSMPORARY STAT4 COMMISSION ON COORDINATION op STATS ACTIVI s, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 34; WINTRAUB & PATT4RSON, THn 'AUTHORITY' IN PENNSYLVA-
E.A, PRO AND CON 3 (Bureau of Municipal Research of Philadelphia 1949).
24. In the following states, the legislature for all practical purposes has control
over borrowing: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Tennessee and Vermont. CouNcIl- ov STATS GOVmRNMSNTS, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 17. A table showing the various state limitations on borrowing appears in
id. at 15.
25. States in this category are: Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming. Id. at 17.
26. States in this category are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Ibid.
27. The lack of a current rational basis in such limitations is concisely set forth in
CHERmAx, THE LAW OF REVENuE BoNms 85-86 (1954).
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process,2- it was natural for state and local governments to cast about
for a means to borrow funds unfettered by constitutional provisions.
One such method lay in the creation of an obligation which would not
be considered of the type of debt limited by the state constitution.
As early as 1895, the Supreme Court of Washington was per-
suaded that a bond, the principal and interest of which were payable
wholly out of the revenues of the facility financed from the proceeds
of the bond, did not constitute debt within the meaning of the consti-
tutional restriction.29 This theory, which became known as the "special
fund doctrine," found acceptance in western 30 and middle-western 3
states and formed the basis for the issuance of revenue bonds in those
states.
In some states, however, early attempts by municipalities to except
revenue-type financing from debt limitations were struck down with the
admonition that one cannot achieve by indirection what cannot be done
directly. 2 In other states, the courts announced a "limited" or "re-
stricted special fund" doctrine in holding that revenue bonds did not
escape constitutional limitations unless the bonds were to be paid
solely from the revenues of the project financed, and not from the
revenues of the entire system to which the improvement was to be an
addition.3
The strongest resistance to winking at constitutional limitations
came where the attempt was made to issue bonds for the construction
of clearly non-revenue producing facilities, such as schools, hospitals
and public buildings, by pledging the proceeds of special funds such
28. In Pennsylvania, for example, a constitutional amendment requires adoption
at two sessions of the General Assembly followed by approval of the electorate. PA.
CoNsr. art. XVIII, § 1.
29. Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41 Pac. 888 (1895) ; cf. It re Canal Cer-
tificates, 19 Colo. 63, 34 Pac. 274 (1893).
30. Farmers State Bank v. City of Conrad, 100 Mont. 415, 47 P.2d 853 (1935);
Butler v. City of Ashland, 113 Ore. 174, 232 Pac. 655 (1925).
31. Underwood v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 205 Ind. 316, 185 N.E. 118 (1933);
Carr v. Fenstermacher, 119 Neb. 172, 228 N.W. 114 (1929) ; Lang v. City of Cavalier,
59 N.D. 75, 228 N.W. 819 (1930).
32. Byars v. City of Griffin, 168 Ga. 41, 54-55, 147 S.E. 66, 72 (1929) ; Feil v. City
of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 50, 129 Pac. 643, 649 (1913) ; Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md.
375, 390 (1869) ; Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 893 (1852) ; Zachary v. City of Wagoner,
146 Okla. 268, 270-71, 292 Pac. 345, 348 (1930); Hesse v. Watertown, 57 S.D. 325,
346, 232 N.W. 53, 63 (1930). Typical language was that of the court in Lesser v. War-
ren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 513-14, 85 Atl. 839, 843 (1912) : "To permit a borough or
city to borrow money under a contract that it shall not be liable for its repayment, but
that the lender must look solely to pledged municipal property or assets, would, in
effect, annul the constitutional restriction on municipal improvidence, and strike down
a safeguard against municipal profligacy."
33. The leading "limited special fund" case is City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill.
457, 62 N.E. 861 (1902). Subsequent decisions have overruled this case: Ward v. Chi-
cago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N.E. 810 (1930) ; Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94
N.E.2d 416 (1950). However, the doctrine has been adopted by other states. See Wil-
liams & Nehemkis, mipra note 13, at 210-11.
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as license fees and cigarette taxes. Even some states which accepted
the special fund doctrine held that such issues fell directly within the
purpose of the debt limitation, since the improvements were not self-
liquidating in that the revenues were not earned by the structures
financed by the bonds. 4
It was not surprising, therefore, particularly in those states in
which courts rejected or restricted the special fund doctrine, that wary
legislators should seek to meet financing needs through the authority
device. For one, the device proved a means to approach the court
with a new conception; for another, it was thought to be a more subtle
subterfuge, since "independence" from the state governmental structure
was an additional argument on which to base exemption from state
debt limitations.
It is not entirely clear why certain courts should have found it
easier to appreciate that the pledge of revenues of authority facilities
is less a debt within the constitutional sense than the pledge of a munic-
ipality of the revenues from improvements. Nevertheless, whether
through subtlety or sophistry, it was the authority that demonstrated
the victory of indirection, and won significant support in such cases
as Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority 35 and Robertson v. Zimmer-
man.38 Subsequent decisions sanctioned authority bond financing even
for non-revenue producing facilities, 7 and set a pattern for expanded
use of the authority in those states 38 as well as in others.
3 9
34. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Executive Council, 207 Iowa 923, 223 N.W. 737
(1929); Boswell v. State, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940 (1937).
35. 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934). To the argument that Lesser v. Warren Bor-
ough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912) had held that the state constitutional debt limits
cannot be indirectly evaded by means of the authority device, the court said: "It is
never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by discovering
a legal way to do it." 316 Pa. at 84-85, 173 AtI. at 298-99. Lesser v. Warren Borough,
supra, was distinguished on the ground that there the borough's bonds were to be se-
cured not alone by the revenue from the waterworks proposed to be purchased, but by
the waterworks itself.
36. 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). See Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 13,
at 206.
37. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, in an agonizing reappraisal and
reversal of a decision a year earlier, Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 Atl. 501 (1936),
held safe from constitutional attack a scheme whereby an authority used the proceeds
of bonds to build a structure, leased it to the regular governmental unit and retired
the bonds from the rental on the lease. Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 At. 140(1937).
38. Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa. 543, 64 A.2d 659 (1949) held that a school
building constructed by the State Public Authority was "self-liquidating" where the
annual rentals used to discharge debt and interest charges were payable out of current
revenues drawn in part from the local school tax levy and part from funds allocated
by the state. See also Datweder v. Hatfield Borough School District, 376 Pa. 555, 104
A.2d 110 (1954).
39. E.g., Becker v. Albion Jefferson School Corp., 132 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1956);
Book v. Indianapolis-Marion Bldg. Authority, 126 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. 1955); Walinske
v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W.2d 73 (1949) (author-
ity to finance construction of joint county and city building approved, relying largely
on Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937)), 34 MiNN. L. Rtv. 360 (1950).
But see Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1955); State ex rel. Washington
State Bldg. Financing Authority v. Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705, 289 P.2d 355 (1955).
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But the field of municipal finance has not remained static. Granted
that in some jurisdictions restrictions on state and municipal borrowing
once presented a compelling reason for the use of authorities, that com-
pulsion now appears largely non-existent, at least in the case of revenue-
producing facilities. Today most courts, more sophisticated in the
necessities of municipal finance and less sympathetic with archaic con-
stitutional restrictions, have granted considerable leeway to local gov-
ernments, and their revenue financing is on terms equal with those of
authorities.
The special fund doctrine, under which an obligation payable
wholly out of the net operating revenues of the enterprise which it
finances is excluded from constitutional debt limitations, has won ap-
proval in almost all of the states having constitutional municipal-debt
limits."0 There has also been wide acceptance of the "expanded special
fund theory" under which the state or local government may pledge
the revenues of any existing revenue-producing utility for the purpose
of constructing or acquiring a different type of utility.4'
Likewise, in many states, the financing even of non-revenue
producing structures and services has withstood the confinement of
constitutional clauses without resort to the authority device. For ex-
ample, in the case of educational facilities, approval has been given to
the construction of dormitories financed by revenue bonds secured by
the pledge of such revenues as earnings of the university press 4 and
fees from other halls; ' in the case of a state hospital, the pledge of con-
tributions made by counties for services rendered to their residents has
been found acceptable; 44 and in recreational facilities, the pledge of
excess revenues of an electric plant supported the construction of an
auditorium, field house and swimming pool.
45
40. Decisions in the following twenty-seven states prescribe to the special fund
doctrine: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Cases are cited in Annot., 146
A.L.R. 604 (1943). In Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee
and Vermont, there are no constitutional municipal debt limits. In four states, the au-
thority to issue revenue bonds independent of the special fund doctrine is in the consti-
tution: GA. CoNsT. art VII, § 2-6005; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8; VA. CoNST. § 127.
41. The question of whether a municipality may secure the payment of the bonds
by a mortgage, not only upon the newly-acquired properties but also upon properties
which it had previously owned is a much disputed one. See discussion in WooD, LEOAL
PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO RE ENUE BOND FINANCING 8-9 (National Institute of Muni-
cipal Law Officers Report No. 112, 1945).
42. Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931).
43. Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321, 13 P.2d 225 (1932).
44. State ex rel. Hawkins v. State Board of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P.2d
116 (1934).
45. McKinney v. Owensboro, 305 Ky. 254,. 203 S.W.2d 24 (1947). See generally
C31RMAIK, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 100-24; Stamps, Municipal Financing of the
Changing Southland, The Bond Buyer, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 26-27.
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Courts in some states have sanctioned the financing of non-
revenue producing structures and services through borrowing which is
repayable from special tax sources, so long as they are not property
taxes; these sources include gasoline taxes," liquor and cigarette
taxes 4 7 and similar levies.48  Indeed, in South Carolina 4 9 a school
bond issue was held not to fall within constitutional debt limitations
where the pledge for the payment of the debt service included the "full
faith, credit and taxing power of the state," as well as the revenue
from a retail sales levy."0
Thus, except in the case of the relatively few states which refuse
to recognize the special fund doctrine or restrict it so as to limit prac-
tical use, it would appear that constitutional limitations on state and
local borrowing are not the obstacle they once were, or are still thought
to be. 1 Municipalities have or may be given resort to revenue bond
46. State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 160 Fla. 230, 34 So. 2d 443
(1948) ; cf. Banner v. City of Laramie, 74 Wyo. 429, 289 P.2d 922 (1955) (revolving
fund of city, composed of proceeds from gasoline and cigarette taxes, created to guar-
antee sufficiency of special assessments pledged to secure city bonds).
47. State v. Tampa, 72 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1954) ; Moses v. Meier, 148 Ore. 185, 35
P.2d 981 (1934); Gruen v. Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
48. State v. Miami, 76 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1954); Foltz v. Indianapolis, 130 N.E.2d
650 (Ind. 1955) (on-street parking meter revenues to finance off-street parking facili-
ties) ; Comereski v. Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E2d 241 (1955) (same). See gen-
erally ABA SscTIoN ov MuNIcn-AL LAWV, CoMMiTEE ON SPrcIAL RZVNUX AND Au-
THOITY OBLIGATIONS, REPoRT (mimeo. 1956).
49. State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951). Contra,
Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1955).
50. As to the moral implication of such facile escape from constitutional limita-
tions, the South Carolina court found "little difference" between its view and the more
usual application of the special fund theory on the ground that it did not believe that"a state in this enlightened day would allow its so-called revenue bonds to go unpaid,
irrespective of its technical, legal liability." The court went on to point out that the
bond buyers pay higher prices for bonds in the nature of general obligations than for
restricted revenue bonds. "Thus it may be said that our rule is of practical advantage,
without sacrifice of principle." State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 507-08,
66 S.E.2d 33, 42 (1951).
51. It should also be pointed out that in some states constitutional amendments
have been adopted easing debt limitations. In New York, for example, article VII,
§ 5(c) of the New York constitution was revised in 1951, providing, inter alia, for the
exclusion of indebtedness for public improvements or services, annually and propor-
tionately to the extent that it yields net revenue to the municipality if the revenue is
at least twenty-five per cent or more of the amount required in that year for interest
and amortization payments. It was the intent of the sponsors of the revised § 5(c)
that it would eliminate much of the necessity and pressure for the creation of public
authorities at the local level. Upon the basis of this section the Governor of New York
refused approval of legislation for the creation of several public authorities at the
municipal level, in one instance stating that "it may be remarked that as a result of a
constitutional amendment ... constitutional debt limits no longer stand in the way
of development of facilities in a city.' TmPORARY STATZ CoMMISSION ON COORDINA-
TION or STAT AcTIvI~zs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35-36. However, since 1951 when
the amendment was adopted, there has not been a noticeable decline in New York in
the request of municipalities for the creation of public authorities.
In Pennsylvania, article IX, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution excludes from
the determination of Philadelphia's borrowing capacity debt incurred to finance public
improvements that may reasonably be expected to yield revenue in excess of operating
expenses sufficient to pay the interest and sinking fund charges. See Philadelphia Peti-
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financing without the necessity of using the authority device. Accord-
ingly, relief from constitutional debt limitations does not, in most
states, provide an adequate ground for authority financing. If the
authority is to be justified, it must be on another basis."'
MANAGEMENT
Another frequently heard advantage claimed for the authority
is that it brings to public functions the characteristics of business enter-
prises, and thus enhances the efficiency of government in achieving
its objective. 3
As a primary demonstration of this thesis, it is contended that the
public authority is managed by more capable men than are regular
government offices. Since members of the authority generally are not
paid and because the authority is largely independent of the state or
municipal government, it is thought that the authority will attract suc-
cessful and public-minded businessmen who will run it with the same
initiative and success demonstrated in their private business."
As further demonstration of the advantages of authority opera-
tion, there is cited its independence and freedom from the inflexibility
and red tape of traditional governmental in such matters as the hiring
of personnel, purchasing and other managerial controls. This thesis,
if sound, is an alarming one. As Dean Fordham has observed:
"Local government of any size is big business, and we need good
management and efficiency throughout. If we cannot substantially
achieve them, short of diffusing various functions among a variety
of ad hoc units, we are indeed in a bad plight." "
But, along with Dean Fordham, the writer believes that it is the
thesis, rather than the plight, that requires examination. In apprais-
tion, 89 Pa. D. & C. 189 (1954) (improvements to water and sewer systems and to
transit facilities). Nevertheless, in 1954 Philadelphia created a municipal airport au-
thority for self-sustaining projects at the city's airport. On more mature reflection, the
city fathers have kept the authority largely inactive and have financed its airport proj-
ects through regular city channels.
52. Aside from lack of advantage, there are disadvantages to authority financing.
These go largely to the question of responsibility and are discussed at pp. 568-69 infra.
53. See Toll Roads and Toll Authorities, 26 STiATs Gov'T 157, 167 (1953).
54. "The entire nature and purpose of the authority requires that its board members
possess considerable freedom and independence, that they be experienced in the technique
of corporate management, that they have a high service of public responsibility, and that
they be willing to give the benefit of their judgment and experience as a matter of
public duty. . . .The high calibre of men selected to serve on authority boards is...a
tribute to the fine record of performance achieved by those authorities. And in turn,
with top flight commissioners being appointed, the continuance of successful authority
operation is assured. It's sort of a continuous, kindly cycle." Kurshan, Authorities as a
Governmental Technique, 11 The Authority, Winter 1953, pp. 11-12.
55. FORDHAm, A LARGF.R CONCZPT OV COMMUNilY 24 (1956).
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ing authority management, a magic aura of success has been attrib-
uted to the fact that authorities are self-supporting. But to be self-
supporting means only that the authority's charges are no less than its
expenditures; it is no guarantee of efficient operation at low cost,
especially where the authority operates under monopoly or semi-
monopoly conditions, and where there has been a pooling of profitable
facilities with unprofitable ones. That authorities are self-supporting
does not mean, therefore, that the cost to the consumer will be reduced.-6
On the other hand, it is no proof of inefficient municipal management
merely because services are not self-supporting or that a city's budget
does not balance.
Comparison of the relative efficiency of regular government and
the authority, if it is to be meaningful, must take place on the plane
of costs and services. That comparison does not seem to have been
made to an extent sufficient to draw general conclusions.
Apart from costs, it is not clear that the authority has an advantage
over the regular government on the basis of quality and independence of
membership and flexibility of managerial controls.
In terms of political independence, it must be remembered that
authority members, like many other government officials, are appointed
by the mayor or governor.57 An appointing official who is politically
minded is not likely to immunize himself from political considerations
in selecting authority members." Even when businessmen are chosen,
their appointment frequently is the result of their political rather than
their business activity. On the other hand, the mayor or governor
who supports merit appointments should attract qualified men for
service within the regular governmental framework as well as within
the authority.59
There is also the question of whether the board-of-directors type
of management, which is typical of the authority,"' is the most desirable
56. See Address by Lennox L. Moak, Thirteenth Annual Conference of Penn-
sylvania Municipal Authorities, Oct. 25, 1955, p. 3 (Bureau of Municipal Research of
Philadelphia mimeo.)
57. There are a few exceptions; e.g., in Pennsylvania, one member of the Gen-
eral State Authority is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
one by the President pro tempore of the Senate; in Nebraska, the directors of the
power districts are chosen through popular elections; in New York, market authorities
are named by county officials.
58. It is true that terms of authority members may overlap the term of the
appointing official. But that is more of an aid to bipartisanship than non-partisanship.
59. In Philadelphia, for example, in recent years, there has been no dearth of
capable businessmen, professional men and academicians serving on city departments,
boards and commissions.
60. Boards and commissions, of course, may exist within the regular governmental
unit. When they do, however, they are generally subject to controls from the city's
executive officers. Moreover, the tendency in state and city government in recent years
has been to diminish the number of such boards.
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form of management for public enterprises. The private corporation,
in terms of which the authority is often analyzed, is significantly dif-
ferent in that generally corporate officers are also directors, and they
fashion corporate policy, as well as execute it, on a full-time basis."1
Moreover, the benefit of having successful citizens serve on boards
may not be realized as frequently as popularly conceived. While the
vigorous young corporate executive may contribute greatly to public
enterprise, he may also be so busy with his corporate affairs that he
can devote little time to his public office; on the other hand, the tired
retired "chairman of the board," while he may be able to afford the
time, may contribute less imagination than inflexibility.
2
In any event, whether department, board or authority, there is a
need in government for men of intelligence and initiative, dedication
and imagination. The authority device is no sine qua non for the at-
traction of such men. Nor is the mayor or governor who is willing
to appoint and support such men confined to one governmental device.6s
In the case of freedom from managerial controls in such areas
as personnel and purchasing, it is true that the authority enjoys greater
freedom and flexibility than the regular state and local governments.
But from the public viewpoint, the "advantage" of such freedom is
dubious. One may recall that it was the undesirability of such flexibility
where the public was concerned that led to their circumscription in the
first instance."
If civil service is the best method of obtaining and retaining good
personnel on the regular governmental level, it is difficult to see why
61. Professor Austin F. Macdonald, who has been an influential voice in many
state and local reorganizations, makes a strong case against board management. In
MACDONALD, AMzIcAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 340 (5th ed. 1955)
he states: "Another good reason for preferring individuals to boards is that the single-
headed department plan is more likely to lead to the performance of administrative
duties by technical experts. Even though a board is composed of laymen who admit-
tedly have no understanding or appreciation of the problems involved and must therefore
hire a trained administrator to carry on the day-to-day routine, there is seldom a
disposition to give the administrator a free hand in the performance of the work for
which he has been employed. The members of the board, forgetful or careless of their
ignorance, are likely to interfere with every detail. They may, and often do, insist upon
examining the persons whom the administrator has selected as subordinates-or, worse
still, appointing their friends and followers to important positions. This is not just a
theoretical danger; long and bitter experience has shown that it is a common trend in
the field of American public administration."
62. The mayor in one large eastern city, not long ago, appointed the presidents of
some of the city's most prominent corporations to a board organized to deal with the
city's traffic problems. Each member of the board had long enjoyed relative autonomy
in his business corporation. The result was chaotic. After six months of facing the
firm and varied views of rugged individualists, the chairman resigned with the sugges-
tion to the mayor that the whole board be scrapped.
63. See ENO FOUNDATION FOR HIGHWAY TRAFrc CONTROL, PARKING; LEGAL,
FINANCIAL, ADMINISTRATmIV 84-86 (1956).
64. See FIELD, SIKES & STONER, STATE GOVERNMENT C. 13 (3d ed., Bates & Field
1953).
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it should not hold good for the authority. The authority is not immune
to the demands of politicians for patronage; indeed, in some cities where
civil service is extensive, the authority is perhaps the last refuge of
the patronage seeker.es
Similarly, if competitive bidding procedures are desirable for the
municipal government, why should they not be desirable for the author-
ity? " Authorities are not immune from favoritism and politics in
their contracts, and the public trust can be abused by part-time mem-
bers as well as by regular government officials. The need for flexibility
of controls should not be confused with abdication of controls. The
fact that bidding and purchasing requirements in many municipalities
may be outmoded points to their revision, 7 not their rejection.
It is significant that the trend in legislation dealing with authori-
ties has been to impose requirements of merit selection, competitive
bidding, budgeting and accounting and other controls found in normal
municipal operation.6 The experience of public administration indi-
cates that, as more abuses are discovered in authority operation, more
controls are imposed.
In sum, the managerial superiority of the authority does not
seem to have been demonstrated, while its freedom from controls does
not appear to be entirely desirable. If municipal governments continue
to revise their managerial controls to conform to modern concepts of
governmental administration, there would appear to be little need to
establish authorities for management reasons alone.
PLANNING AND RESPONSIBILITY
An authority that exercises its functions within the geographical
limits of one general function unit 69 invariably poses problems for the
state or city planners.
Most state and local authorities have been conceived for a
single or limited purpose job. Even if more than one project
65. In Philadelphia, for example, it is no secret that prospective employees of most
of the local authorities obtain political clearance before they are employed, a situation
that does not exist in the case of regular city employers who are under a board civil
service system. PHILADELPHIA HomE RULE CHARTER § 7-401.
66. The purpose of competitive bidding is to obtain "the best results at the lowest
price and to forestall fraud, favoritism and corruption in the issuing of contracts."
RHYNE, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS WITH ANNOTATED MODEL FoRMus 35
(1952) and cases cited therein.
67. See FIELD, SIxES & STONER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 351; RHYNE, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 21-24.
68. CouNCiL or STATE GovmxnmSS, PUBLIC AUTHORITMS IN THS STAMS 80-88,
106-109 (1953).
69. A general function unit refers to the regular governmental body operating in all
areas of government, viz., a township, city, county and state.
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is involved, the projects generally fall within a single area such as
transportation, sewage, port facilities or the like. Planning by the
authority, even where sufficiently developed, is inevitably centered
around its area of operation.
Municipal and state planning, however, cannot be as single-
minded.70 The development of playgrounds, for example, is related
to the planning of residential developments; the desirability of airport
locations may depend on the question of planned industrial develop-
ments. In this broad framework the authority is often a single trader
pursuing its own projects without participation in the-over-all planning
program.
The Joint Committee on Urban Traffic Congestion of the Ameri-
can Bar Association has expressed the point in the context of parking
authorities as follows:
"The main disadvantage of a parking authority appears to
to be the use of an ad hoc governmental unit in an area where
integrated planning is of the utmost importance. The provision
of parking facilities is only one aspect of any urban traffic problem.
Closely related are the problems of street use, encouragement of
mass transportation, encouragement of private enterprise solu-
tions, and other aspects of city planning development. The park-
ing authority frequently proceeds to provide parking facilities be-
fore the relationship of these facilities to the whole traffic problem
has been thought out and a fully integrated program decided
upon. The initiative and spirit demonstrated by parking au-
thority projects moving at a rapid pace in a manner stimulating
private development, may seem commendable at the time but
the projects may eventually prove unsound and unrelated to the
city's overall plan to solve its traffic problems." 7'
The legislature can, of course, require the authority to obtain the
clearance of the appropriate planning body.72  But such requirement
would not appear to provide an adequate solution to the problem. An
example drawn from the writer's experience will help to illustrate.
A few years ago the parking authority of a large eastern city
selected a particular area for the construction of a parking garage.
Plans were prepared for submission to the city's planning commission.
At the meeting of the planning commission, the most prominent mem-
70. See PUBLIC ADmiNISTRATION SERVICE No. 86; ACTION FOR CITIEs, A GUIDE
FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING 1-3 (1945); MACDONALD, op. cit. supra note 61, at
407-15; FORDH3Am, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 695-96 (1949).
71. ENO FOUNDATION FOR HIGHWAY TRAFFIC CONTROL, PARKING; LEGAL, FINAN-
cIAL, ADImisTRA~rV 88 (1956).
72. Such a requirement, however, does not appear to be typical in the case of most
authorities at the present time.
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bers of the authority appeared-representatives of stores in the neigh-
borhood of the proposed garage, members of the chamber of commerce
and other proponents of the garage. The commission's ideas for
that area were hardly in a formative stage. There had been some talk
of encouraging multi-story housing facilities on the site. But now the
planning commission was faced with the necessity of an immediate
decision.
In dealing with regular city departments, this commission had
the assurance that its decisions would be enforced by the city's chief
executive. But dealing with an independent public body was a dif-
ferent matter. The authority considered itself on an equal govern-
mental level. With due subtlety the authority indicated that if the
commission's decision was delayed or unfavorable, the commission
faced a battle with the authority. The authority had its own public-
ity department; some of its members were politically active in a party
opposite to the city administration; it had a record of successful achieve-
ment. Had the planning commission resisted under such circumstances,
it would have been a rare act indeed. The garage was authorized.
A few years later, when it was too late, the garage proved to be an
obstacle rather than an aid to the solution of the city's problems.
Planning by its nature looks to the coordination and integration
of governmental functions. There is an over-all and continuing aspect
to planning that requires involvement of all of the community resources.
On the local and state level, the fragmentation of public functions
among many independent bodies pursues, in effect, a counter philosophy.
The disadvantage of the local authority from the planner's view-
point may have been obscured by the confusion of the purposes of
local authorities with those created on a bi-state and regional level.
A different situation is presented in the latter case since such bodies
are often the result of a comprehensive plan for a region " which,
because of the confinements of political boundaries, can be implemented
only through the creation of area development authorities. It should
be noted, however, that even along interjurisdictional lines, there has
arisen a hodge-podge of authorities performing similar or identical
services and engaged in uneconomic competition, 4 which points to the
73. For example, the comprehensive plan for the New York-New Jersey port area
developed by the New York-New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission in
1920 led to the creation of the New York Port Authority in 1921. See Edelstein, The
Authority Plan--Tool of Modern Government, 28 CORNU.m L.Q. 177 (1943); Gold-
stein, Metropolitan Area Government-A Functional Approach, the Authority Role,
The Bond Buyer, Sept. 8, 1956, pp. 3, 3941.
74. See Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47
YALE L.J. 14, 29-33 (1937).
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need of a broader planning base that will encompass and direct the
work of all of the authorities in a particular region."
The merits and demerits of the state and local authority must also
be evaluated in the area of political philosophy. It is a tenet, if not an
axiom, of democratic society that government be politically responsible
to the electorate.7" If we are to divorce a governmental body from
direct control of politically responsible officers, it seems fair to ask
that the reasons for such divorcement be compelling ones.
Proponents of the authority have offered justification in the claim
that certain types of entrepreneurial action can be more efficiently man-
aged if made independent of the regular channels of government.
77
Such justification (if factually correct), might be adequate if use of
the authority meant only the choice of a management device. Invari-
ably, however, use of the authority cannot be insulated from questions
of broad and significant governmental policy.
For example, one of the significant questions facing state and local
governments is the extent to which "benefit received" principles should
be the yardstick for public improvements. Under the "benefit re-
ceived" concept, improvements are paid by charges upon users. The
advantages claimed for this concept are that it avoids the necessity
of heavier tax burdens, it provides the consumer with concrete evi-
dence of the value of his payments, and it serves as a measure for
the determination of the extent of need and of popular demand. 8 On
the other hand, traditionally in a democratic society the creation of
governmental services has not depended on the potential ability of the
using public to pay for the service, but upon such tests as the general
welfare of the community, the development of an area and a standard
of the minimum level of services.
75. This is not a suggestion that regional general function units should be estab-
lished. However, for some possible developments along interstate lines, see FORDHAM,
A LARGER CoNc-rv OF COMMUNITY c. 2 (1956) ; Edelstein, supra note 73, at 190.
76. It is a generally accepted principle of political organization that responsibility
is weakened by the diffusion of governmental functions among numerous plural-headed
agencies. The trend in political reorganizations of local and state governments has been
toward integration or centralization of executive authority. See COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO
THE CoNGREss 44-45 (1955); COUNCIL OV STATs GOVERNmiNTs, THE ADmINISTRATIVS
ORGANIZATION or STATE GOVmNMXNT 4-7 (1950); Bucx, THs REORGANIZATION o
STATS GOVRNM NTS IN THE UNITED STATS 14-28 (National Municipal League 1938).
77. See discussion at pp. 562-65 supra.
78. An evaluation of the "benefit received" doctrine is found in TzmPoRARY STATE
COMMISSION ON COORDINATION OP STATS AcTMTlmS, FIRST INTERIM STAVV REPoRT
ON PUBLIC AuTHoRITIEs UNDER NEw YORE STATE 25-30 (1954). In practice, the
advantages are not always realized; for example, the claim that projects serve as an
objective criteria of need loses force where, as is often the case, there is a poolingjof
profitable and unprofitable projects, or where projects receive subsidization in the form
of direct grants, use of government facilities, tax exemptions and other means.
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The choice between following benefit-received principles and the
traditional criteria appears to be the kind of policy decision elected
officials should properly make and be responsible for, not only initially
but on a continuing basis. That decisional process for each project
is largely lost by use of the authority device which, by its nature, is
committed to benefit-received principles in the operation of its projects.79
Similarly, whether users of a profitable project should support
nonprofitable projects, or what priority should be assigned to given
projects, or what the comparative merits are, in the case of each project,
of financing from tax revenues, general obligation issues or revenue
bonds, are all questions involving basic governmental policy. To re-
move such questions from the regular orbit of governmental control
is to remove them from responsibility to the electorate.' The benefits
that accrue from the authority do not appear sufficient to justify such
departure from our governmental philosophy.
CONCLUSION
The need for the authority appears greatest on the bi-state or re-
gional level as a means of handling problems that cross jurisdictional
lines. On a state and local level, however, the authority does not appear
as attractive an instrument as has been commonly supposed. Its finan-
cing devices are now available in most jurisdictions to municipal and
state governments. Its management advantages are largely unproved.
In the planning area, it may prove disruptive of efforts to integrate
community efforts along the lines of a comprehensive plan. And on
the level of political responsibility it presents a departure from dem-
ocratic traditions unwarranted by need or experience.
79. Apart from the difference in governmental philosophy represented by the two
approaches, it should be remembered that the cost of authority financing is significantly
higher than the cost of general obligation issues. See survey by CouNcIL or STATE
GOvERNMXNTS, PuBLic AuToRIES IN THE. STATEs 70-75 (1953). The cost factor
would also seem to be an element that should be reviewed on a continuing basis by
politically responsible officials.
80. See Nzv YORK ST.ATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIoN CommirTE, LocAL
GOVERNMENT AND HOME RULE 244 (1938); Moak, Let Us Serve the Public, 14 The
Authority, Sept. 1956, pp. 18-19. The discussion here has related chiefly to the
local and state authority; however, lack of democratic responsibility in the case of the
bi-state authority is also a serious problem, as has been ably discussed in Netherton,
Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8
VAND. L. REv. 678, 691-97 (1955). On the bi-state level, however, the alternatives to
authority operation are not as available as they are on the state and municipal level.
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